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Worksharing and Layoffs 
R.W. Crowley 
Worksharing is more common in western Europe than in North 
America, but it has been receiving increasing attention hère.1 In Canada, 
this is partially because of récent changes in fédéral législation providing 
greater incentives for employers and employées to enter worksharing ar-
rangements. 
Layoffs rather than worksharing hâve been the usual response to 
decreases in levels of économie activity because layoffs compromise neither 
union emphasis on seniority nor the préoccupation of employers with their 
right to allocate workers to jobs. As well, labour législation has been design-
ed generally to accommodate layoffs, and inadvertently may hâve 
discouraged alternatives like worksharing. For example, most législation 
provides for severance pay and advance notice in case of layoff, but makes 
no mention of suitable worksharing arrangements. 
Worksharing can be simply defined as a réduction in hours worked; in 
the absence of an équivalent increase in productivity, it has the effect of ex-
panding employment opportunities at a constant level of output. Paren-
thetically, one might note that some observers hâve argued that increases in 
productivity in fact resuit from such arrangements.2 
The purpose of this paper is to.examine some of the reasons why 
worksharing has been so slow in coming. The main contention is that the 
factors noted above hâve militated against worksharing arrangements even 
though, in some circumstances, they would hâve advantages over layoffs. 
As a policy measure, worksharing makes most sensé where decreased pro-
duction is temporary, for example a cyclical downturn. It is a transitional 
measure and is not appropriate in situations where an industry is declining 
and structural labour force adjustment is required. Where permanent 
réductions are required, other programs, such as adjustment assistance, are 
more appropriate.3 
* CROWLEY, R.W., Director General, Central Analytical Services, Canada Depart-
ment of Labour. 
** I am indebted to Tony Wohlfarth for substantial assistance in preparing this paper. 
An earlicr version was presented to the annual meetings of the Canadian Industrial Relations 
Institute, London, Ontario, May 1978. 
1 After preparing this paper, an excellent overview of issues was published: Peter 
SADLIER-BROWN, Work Sharing in Canada: Problems and Possibilities, Montréal, C D . 
Howe Research Institute, June 1978. 
2 This opinion is expressed by officiais responsible for the Canadian program. As well, 
cf., N.J. MCNEFF et. ai, "Alternatives to Employée Layoffs: Worksharing and Prelayoff 
Consultation", Personnel, Vol. 55, No. 1, January-February, 1978, pp. 60-64; and "Measures 
to Alleviate Unemployment in the Médium Term: Worksharing", Department of Employment 
(U.K.) Gazette, Vol. 86, No. 4, April 1978, pp. 400-402. 
3 Adjustment assistance can be payments either to capital (i.e. industry) or to labour. 
Most such programs are the former. 
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Besides increased productivity, if in fact such an increase occurs, a 
worksharing program has three benefits. From the employer viewpoint, it 
facilitâtes the rétention of a skilled labour force, and hence reduces recruit-
ment and training costs when conditions improve. Second, it minimizes the 
incidence of total layoff and hence the resulting hardship among employées 
affected. Third, some would see decreased expenditures on unemployment 
insurance as an advantage. 
Récent amendments to the Unemployment Insurance Act remove some 
of the institutional barriers which previously inhibited the introduction of 
worksharing arrangements. Under Section 37, introduced in 1977, the Com-
mission is empowered to establish régulations for the opération of a pilot 
worksharing program. Once a worksharing agreement has been approved, 
récipients are eligible for unemployment insurance benefits at the regular 
rate of 66 2 /3% of insurable earnings for those days off the job. Unlike 
regular benefits, no waiting period is imposed on récipients. Moreover, 
should total layoff follow a period of a worksharing, regular unemploy-
ment insurance entitlement is unaffected. (Benefit levels in such situations, 
however, may be lowered because the earnings basis for calculating benefits 
could be lower.) 
In effect, Section 37 acts as an exemption from normal unemployment 
insurance provisions regarding partial employment. Under thèse regular 
provisions, an employée working greater than two thirds of normal hours 
would be disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. 
As of October 1978, twenty-two worksharing agreements had been 
signed. Only one involved a permanent réduction in work force. The 
average duration of the agreements is 21 weeks though three hâve exceeded 
the 26 week maximum set out in the régulations. 2400 workers hâve been or 
are on worksharing and it is estimated about 800 workers otherwise would 
hâve been laid off. In many ways this tentative and flexible first step has 
probably been a very good way to proceed.4 
EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
There is no doubt a lesson to be learned from European expérience 
with worksharing. It is not possible hère to provide a detailed examination 
but a few points of comparison can be drawn.5 
4 For a description of the expérience to date with worksharing, see Department/Com-
mission of Employment and Immigration, unpublished paper, November 1, 1977; "Work-
sharing in Canada", unpublished paper, April 1978. 
5 For a detailed description of the European work-sharing programs, see Commission 
of the European Communities, "Work Sharing", unpublished paper, February 20, 1978; 
Commission of the European Communities, unpublished paper, "Work-sharing - Objectives 
and Effects", February 24, 1978; Department of Employment and Immigration, "Work-
sharing in Europe", unpublished paper, May 20, 1978. SADLIER-BROWN's pamphlet, op. 
cit., contains a comparison of Canadian and West German programs, pp. 5-8. 
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Government sponsored worksharing programs in western Europe ail 
specify a maximum duration. Limits range from a low of 8 weeks in France 
to just under a year in the worksharing program recently introduced in the 
United Kingdom. In ail thèse countries worksharing is perceived as a 
substitute for unemployment insurance. Italy, for example, offers relatively 
low unemployment benefits, but pays worksharing benefits to provide those 
on short-time with 80% of their former gross earnings. Workshanng is 
most prévalent in West Germany. During their 1975 recession, 775,000 
received thèse benefits, resulting in an estimated réduction of 170,000 per-
sons from the ranks of the unemployed - équivalent to .$% decrease in the 
unemployment rate.6 
Using such programs inevitably leads to abuses, and this is an area 
where one can perhaps learn most. One example well documented in Italy is 
where short-time workers "moonlight" with other part-time jobs. It is ob-
viously difficult to police a System where the incentive may be that earnings 
with benefits exceed previous earnings. However, this problem may not be 
extensive if layoffs occur when there is a gênerai recession and employment 
is difficult to find. Another abuse has been for employers to take advantage 
of government sponsored worksharing either to permanently reduce their 
work force or to avoid payroll costs for some workers who would not other-
wise be laid off. For example, the services of highly skilled workers may be 
retained in anticipation of an upturn, even without worksharing incentives. 
Similarly, it may be easier to "layoff" an employée if an employer knows 
the government will provide support over an extended period of time. Ob-
viously, thèse "leakages" are difficult to detect. 
WORKSHARING IN COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
Although government-sponsored worksharing programs are novel in 
Canada, the concept is not entirely alien. In 341 collective agreements in-
volving more than 500 employées in Canadian manufacturing in 1976, 18 
per cent made provision for the distribution of work during slack periods.7 
In gênerai, thèse clauses require union and management consultation (that 
is, they are optional) and specify a minimum period prior to an individual 
being laid-off completely. They are most prévalent in the textile, clothing, 
and knitting industries - indicating, perhaps, the significant variability of 
work volume in those industries. There is also tendency for them to be more 
common in the larger bargaining units - possibly indicating greater 
awareness of worksharing as an alternative. 
The incidence of thèse clauses tells us nothing about their actual usage, 
however, and in fact the statistics may be misleading. A U.S. study found 
6For a discussion of work-sharing as a policy measure to reduce unemployment, see S.A. 
LEVITAN and R.S. BELOUS, "Reduced Worktime - Tool to Fight Unemployment", 
Worklife, Vol. 3, No. 4, April, 1978. 
7 Provisions in Major Collective Agreements Covering Employées in Canadian 
Manufacturing industries, Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1977. 
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that where worksharing and seniority provisions co-exist, the former are 
rarely used.8 A further indication of this is the frequency of severance 
payments and supplementary unemployment benefit clauses in contracts. 
Thèse payments essentially "sweeten the pot" for those laid-off by sup-
plementing unemployment insurance benefits. Some 58% of the 341 large 
collective agreements cited above provided for either severance or sup-
plementary payments. 
The incidence of seniority-on-layoff provisions is still another in-
dicator. Fully 95% of the 341 agreements required that seniority and/or 
related skill requirements be taken into account in the event of layoff. This 
is a clear indication of the important rôle played by the seniority system in 
protecting job security in the unionized sector. Reflecting management con-
cern with protecting their flexibility, four-fifths of thèse agreements re-
quired considération of both skill and seniority in considering layoffs. 
ARGUMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN USED AGAINST WORKSHARING 
Briefs presented to the Parliamentary Committee examining the Act to 
amend the Unemployment Insurance Act provide some valuable insight into 
the principal objections to the worksharing concept.9 
First, it was argued that worksharing would undermine the collective 
bargaining process. From the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) brief: 
If collective agreements freely made are in force or under negotiations 
worksharing as envisaged hère could well represent an instrusion into 
the collective bargaining process.10 
The Canadian Chamber of Commerce stated in its written brief that: 
Collective bargaining agreements are tailored to what the parties believe 
are matters of substance, and layoff policy is one of thèse matters. n 
More forcefully, in its oral brief, the Chamber argued that they prefer to 
hâve employer-employées discussing an arrangement without involving the 
Unemployment Insurance Commission (now CEIQ.12 
Union briefs generally reflected concern that worksharing would 
weaken worker benefits. Again from the CLC submission: 
8 HENLE, Peter, Work-Sharing as an Alternative to Layoffs, Washington, Congres-
sional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1976. 
9 "Briefs presented to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Labour, Man-
power and Immigration", April - May 1977. For a summary see Lawrence KELLY, "Work-
Sharing: Union and Employer Views", IR Research Reports, Vol. 2, No. 2, November, 1977, 
pp. 11-14. 
10 Brief of the Canadian Labour Congress to the House of Commons Standing Commit-
tee on Labour, Manpower, and Immigration, p. 16. 
11 Canadian Chamber of Commerce Brief, p. 7. 
12 Canadian Chamber of Commerce, oral statement to House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Labour Manpower and Immigration. 
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Not only would ail hands hâve to work for less than their normal earn-
ings but pension plans and other fringe benefits already in place would 
suffer a dépréciation in dollar value.13 
The United Auto Workers were concerned that worksharing would be 
bénéficiai to the employer, and at the same time mask the true dimensions 
of the unemployment problem: 
We are totally opposed to work-sharing programs. Such programs 
historically tend to subsidize employers. They also give the illusion that 
the unemployment problem is eased when in fact it is only being shared 
more evenly by working people.14 
The argument that worksharing would be a subsidy was also made by 
management organizations, though in a différent form. The Canadian Con-
struction Association posed the question as follows: 
What care is to be exercised to ensure that the program does not simply 
put off the day of wrenching adjustments required for the enterprise to 
compete sucessfully in the market place?15 
The Canadian Manufacturers Association concurred, saying that "the 
scheme could be used to subsidze inefficient businesses." 
Management représentatives also argued that worksharing would raise 
labour costs, since fringe benefits would hâve to be maintained and the 
sharing of work would imply a loss of specialization and, therefore, a drop 
in productivity. From the brief by the Employer's Council of British 
Columbia: 
If such a program were instituted, in many cases there would be a lower-
ing of the efficiency level of the opération because jobs cannot easily be 
broken down into a direct ratio between numbers and skills required... 
A second major objection to this program is that the employer would in-
cur higher overhead costs. If employées were to be kept on payroll, even 
though their wages would be supplemented by the government 
employers would be required to maintain employée benefits.16 
There is an apparent inconsistency between claims that worksharing 
both subsidizes and increases labour costs. It is a subsidy only in the sensé 
that it facilitâtes the rétention of a workforce which would otherwise be 
laid-off. It increases labour costs since most agreements signed to date re-
quire the employer to maintain full "fringe" benefits for ail employées. The 
Émployment and Immigration Commission views this, probably correctly, 
as an expenditure in lieu of the higher costs of future recruiting if total 
layoffs were instituted. 
13 Canadian Labour Congress Brief, p. 16. 
14 United Auto Workers Brief, p. 7. 
15 Canadian Construction Association Brief, p. 15. 
16 Employer's Council of British Columbia Brief, p. 8. 
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The strongest négative prédiction concerning the worksharing pro-
posais was the following statement by the CLC: 
We doubt very much that any legitimate union in the Canadian context 
of that term would be inclined to agrée to the projected plan.17 
Subséquent developments hâve not borne this out. Of the worksharing 
agreements signed to date, three-quarters involve accredited bargaining 
agents. Represented in this group are locals of some of the largest unions in 
this country. The United Steel Workers of America alone hâve six such 
agreements. 
There is at least one explanation for this apparent inconsistency. At the 
level of "high policy", unions are understandably opposed to worksharing. 
Not only does it threaten the seniority System, but it represents an intrusion 
into the bilatéral bargaining relationship. However, from the perspective of 
the union local, the venture may be appealing. Seniority issues aside, it is an 
équitable solution to the layoff dilemma, and it allows the local to retain its 
full membership. 
It is apparent from thèse briefs that there is a natural conservatism of 
parties to collective bargaining against worksharing arrangements. But this 
is not the only obstacle. At least three institutional factors can also be cited. 
First, unemployment insurance funds hâve been unavailable in the past 
to supplément earnings from partial employment. Of course, récent changes 
take care of this. Second, the assessment of unemployment insurance 
premiums does not take account of layoff "risk" évidence in past employ-
ment records, and hence provides no incentive to minimize the incidence of 
layoffs. By contrast the U.S. System of expérience rating assesses differen-
tial premiums, borne completely by the employer and thereby encourages 
manpower planning to minimize employment fluctuations.18 Third, labour-
related législation is built around the layoff approach. For example, as men-
tioned earlier, most législation contains elaborate layoff procédures but no 
mention of worksharing and its implications for benefits and the like. 
Presumably in the near future, various labour jurisdictions will hâve to ex-
amine this closely. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize, the Canadian situation is characterized by a union 
movement which places emphasis on seniority, private sector employers 
who guard their right to allocate their workforce to jobs and a government 
approach which has provided little incentive for partial employment. Under 
thèse conditions it is not surprising that worksharing arrangements hâve not 
prevailed in this country. If the current pilot program is successful, it might 
be expected that the attitudes of labour and management will mellow and 
that government régulations will permanently change to accommodate 
worksharing arrangements. 
17 Canadian Labour Congress, op. cit., p. 16. 
18 CLARK, Robert, Adjusting H ours to lncreusc Jobs - An Analysis of the Options, 
Spécial Report No. 15, Washington, National Commission for Manpower Policy, 1977. 
